Does the individual have a right not to use the internet? As public services, healthcare, social benefits, and political participation increasingly depend on digital technologies, access to the internet is becoming a condition of participation in social, economic, and political life. But what does freedom mean when being online is no longer entirely a matter of choice? This book examines the right of access to the internet and the right not to use it as complementary dimensions of digital individual freedom. Drawing on constitutional law, EU law, international human rights law, and comparative analysis of Australia, France, and Poland, it explores the tension between expanding digital access and the growing difficulty of remaining offline. The work identifies digital coercion as a structural condition in which legal, institutional, and market arrangements make non-use costly or impracticable, limiting the individual's ability to choose whether and how to engage with digital technologies. It develops a doctrinal framework centred on six interrelated elements: access, meaningful choice, the right not to use the internet, analogue alternatives, state obligations, and digital autonomy. It argues that protecting digital freedom requires not only ensuring access, but also preserving a genuine possibility of opting out. The book will be of interest to scholars, practitioners, and policymakers working in constitutional law, EU law, human rights, digital rights, and technology regulation.